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Devin C. Berrigan*
The frustration of purpose doctrine is a contracts defense
that has garnered increased interest since the COVID-19
pandemic’s initial wave. To manage this public health
emergency, many governments have issued orders restricting
the operation of businesses. These orders, while necessary, put
commercial lessees in a bind once it came time to pay rent
because these restrictions drastically cut their profits. Other
frustrating events, like war and natural disasters, cause the
same problems, yet the current frustration of purpose doctrine
is too narrow to be practically helpful to these lessees. This Note
examines the English and Canadian frustration doctrines and
draws on both in proposing two alterations to the American
doctrine. These alterations would remedy the doctrine’s
ineffectiveness, brought to light recently by the COVID-19
pandemic, and would attempt to ensure that the risk now falls
on the party better equipped to bear it—the lessor.

J.D. Candidate, 2023, University of Georgia School of Law; B.A., 2019, University of
Georgia. I would like to thank Dean Kent Barnett for his guidance and advice in writing this
Note and the Editorial and Executive Board Editors for their help.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“Man plans, God laughs.”1 A scheduled flight home is delayed for
months because of a pandemic.2 A vacation rental’s view is obscured
by smoke from nearby wildfires.3 A business’s permits will not be
issued because of a neighbor’s refusal to comply with the municipal
code.4 A restaurant can no longer operate for in-person dining
because of local, state, or federal orders.5 All of these are examples
of events that might frustrate a contract. It might not seem fair to
enforce a contract in these instances because an event outside the
control of either contracting party has frustrated the contract’s
purpose.
The frustration of purpose doctrine is an oft-discussed yet rarely
implemented legal doctrine that has garnered increased interest
since the United States first felt the COVID-19 pandemic’s effects.6
The inevitability of pandemics, wars, and natural disasters means
that these acts of God will continue to frustrate leases into the
foreseeable future. In this light, the frustration of purpose doctrine
should be reevaluated. This certainty that frustrating events will
occur means that a more just solution should be implemented to aid
lessees who are stuck in leases and required to pay rents for spaces
they no longer need.

1 This Yiddish proverb about the unpredictability of life describes the reason for the
frustration of purpose doctrine. See Saul Levine, Man Plans, and God Laughs, PSYCH. TODAY,
(Feb.
26,
2016)
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/our-emotionalfootprint/201602/man-plans-and-god-laughs (explaining the meaning of the Yiddish phrase).
2 See, e.g., Sohi Vacations Ltd. v. Waraich, 2021 CanLII 218 (Can. B.C. C.R.T.) (considering
a frustration of purpose claim for a pandemic-related flight delay).
3 See, e.g., Gingras v. Smith-Friesen, 2018 CanLII 826 (Can. B.C. C.R.T.) (analyzing a
frustration of purpose claim for a vacation rental cancellation due to smoke from wildfires
obscuring the rental’s view).
4 See, e.g., Garner v. Ellingson, 501 P.2d 22, 22–23 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (reviewing a
frustration of purpose claim based upon the lessor’s failure to fix their nearby property,
causing lessees to be denied municipal permits).
5 See, e.g., AGW Sono Partners, LLC v. Downtown Soho, LLC, 273 A.3d 186, 190 (Conn.
2022) (considering a lessor’s claim for a restaurant’s failure to pay rent due to a statewide
order closing bars and restaurants).
6 See Scott Luskin & Sarah Odia, Frustration of Purpose and Impracticability of Contracts
Due to COVID-19, JD SUPRA (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/frustrationof-purpose-and-25271/ (“For those contracts that do not address unforeseen circumstances,
the rarely invoked doctrines of impracticability of performance and frustration of purpose
may be relevant during this unprecedented time.”).
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This Note argues that the frustration of purpose doctrine should
be expanded to allow for easier lease payment forgiveness in
commercial settings by softening the substantial frustration
requirement and clarifying the foreseeability requirement. Part II
examines the frustration of purpose doctrine’s origin, policy reasons
for its implementation, and its current use in the United States.
This Part also compares the frustration of purpose doctrines in the
United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Part III identifies
a problem with the doctrine—that it is too narrow to be practically
useful—and proposes alterations to it.

II. BACKGROUND
The frustration of purpose doctrine excuses performance when a
party’s purpose for entering into the contract has been totally, or
near totally, destroyed.7 Generally, “[t]he contract defense of
frustration requires that: (1) the [party’s] principal purpose[] in
making the contract is frustrated; (2) without that party’s fault; (3)
‘by the occurrence of an event, the non-occurrence of which was a
basic assumption on which the contract was made.’”8 In the
foundational case Krell v. Henry,9 which created the frustration of
purpose doctrine, the court held that a promisor was excused from
his obligation to pay for the room he had rented when the coronation
procession he had planned to view from the room was postponed.10
The court in Krell reasoned that because the condition that the
coronation would occur was “contemplat[ed by] both parties” and
was “the foundation of the contract,” its nonoccurrence was
sufficient to frustrate the contract and suspend performance.11

7 See Lloyd v. Murphy, 153 P.2d 47, 50 (Cal. 1944) (stating that performance might be
excused if an “unanticipated circumstance, the risk of which should not be fairly thrown on
the promisor, has made performance vitally different from what was reasonably expected”);
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS. § 265 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1981) (noting that
one’s performance may be made worthless to the other party because of changed
circumstances).
8 Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Chi. & Nw. Transp. Co., 263 N.W.2d 189,
194 (Wis. 1978) (quoting Wm. Beaudoin & Sons, Inc. v. County of Milwaukee, 217 N.W.2d
373, 377 (Wis. 1974)).
9 [1903] 2 KB 740, https://www.iclr.co.uk/document/1890226976/casereport_49530/html.
10 See id. at 750–52 (holding that defendant was excused from the remainder of his payment
because King Edward VII’s coronation was postponed).
11 Id. at 754.
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Further, the court noted that the agreement was a license to use the
room rather than a demise of the property.12 The entire nation
assumed that the coronation was inevitable,13 and the event’s
postponement was so unforeseen that it caused unrest throughout
the United Kingdom.14
The frustration of purpose doctrine must be distinguished from
the related, and often confused, doctrines of impossibility and
impracticability. These other doctrines excuse a party’s obligations
only if they have become incapable or nearly incapable of being
performed.15 Because performance is still possible in cases of
frustration,16 the doctrine generally serves the interests of parties
“[who] are to pay money in return for [their] performances,” while
the doctrine of impracticability generally benefits parties who have
agreed to provide a good or service.17 For example, defendant
owners who provided the use of their music hall were excused from
performance under the impossibility doctrine when the music hall
burned down because they were no longer able to provide that
service.18 But when a contractor no longer needed the concrete
medians it had requested from its subcontractor because its state

12 See id. at 750 (“It was not a demise of the rooms, or even an agreement to let and take
the rooms. It is a licence to use rooms for a particular purpose and none other.”).
13 See Ben Roberts, The Complex Holiday Calendar of 1902: Responses to the Coronation of
Edward VII and the Growth of Edwardian Event Fatigue, 28 TWENTIETH CENTURY BRIT.
HIST. 489, 489–90 (2017) (noting that Edward VII’s coronation was the “only coronation of a
British monarch to be postponed due to illness”). Not only was the postponement a surprise,
but it was also due to Edward VII’s appendicitis diagnosis that was so severe that it required
emergency surgery. See id. at 500 (explaining the need for emergency surgery due to the rapid
deterioration of Edward VII’s condition).
14 See id. at 502 (describing how the postponement left the “Stock Exchange in turmoil”
and disrupted daily life in the United Kingdom).
15 See 14 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 74.1, LEXIS (database updated 2022) (noting that the
impossibility doctrine originally required absolute impossibility but evolved to an
impracticability standard that required “an unforeseen, severe hardship” instead).
16 See 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 650 (3d ed. 2004) (explaining
that performance in Krell was still possible but that it would be without benefit to the
defendant).
17 Id.
18
See Taylor v. Caldwell (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309; 3 B. & S. 826,
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/1863/J1.html (holding that because the music hall
was destroyed without fault of either party, both parties were excused from performance).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2022

5

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 57, No. 1 [2022], Art. 8

408

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:403

department customer changed its order, it was excused from paying
for lost profits under the frustration doctrine.19
Despite the distinct requirements of these doctrines, their
application varies by court. In Lloyd v. Murphy,20 the leading
American case on frustration of purpose, the defendant car dealer
failed to carry the heavy burden of proving that the value of his lease
with the plaintiffs had been destroyed when the federal government
limited the sale of automobiles as part of wartime rationing.21
Unlike in Krell, in which the defendant licensee’s entire purpose for
renting the room was destroyed and he would have gotten nothing
that he bargained for had he performed, the defendant car dealer in
Lloyd was still able to conduct its business, albeit at a smaller and
less profitable scale.22 In addition to the requirement that the
purpose of the contract be frustrated, the defendant will not be able
to recover if they contributed to the frustration.23 Finally,
foreseeability of the frustrating event is not sufficient to bar
recovery; it is, however, “a factor to consider.”24
A. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

1. Allocation of Risk. As the court in Lloyd explained, the decision
of whether to allow the frustration defense rests largely on public

19 See Chase Precast Corp. v. John J. Paonessa Co., 566 N.E.2d 603, 604–05 (Mass. 1991)
(holding that the defendant was not responsible for the state department’s decision not to
purchase the medians and that the risk had not been allocated to the defendant in the
contract).
20 153 P.2d 47 (Cal. 1944).
21 See id. at 51 (“Defendant may use the premises for the purpose for which they were
leased. New automobiles and gasoline continue to be sold.”).
22 See id. (emphasizing that the purpose of the contract has not been frustrated if the
business conducted has not been made impossible or illegal).
23 See Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Chi. & Nw. Transp. Co., 263 N.W.2d
189, 194 (1978) (stressing that the defendant railroad operator contributed to its own
frustration because by voluntarily joining Amtrak, it was no longer required to provide
passenger rail service, which was the principal reason it had rented the depot space).
24 Id. at 195. Although the defendant could not have reasonably anticipated that the federal
government would relieve railroads of its duty to provide passenger service, it had been
enduring steady passenger reductions for years and reasonably could have predicted further
reductions. Id.; see also Lloyd, 153 P.2d at 51 (noting that the law authorizing the federal
government’s order to discontinue the sale of new automobiles had been in effect for over a
year and that the entire industry was in the midst of a transition to aid the military as it
geared up for World War II).
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policy.25 Often, contracts will allocate the risks from acts of God
using a force majeure clause.26 If the parties do not do so, however,
courts may have to determine to which party the contract implicitly
assigns the risk.27 In determining who bears the risk of a contract,
courts often consider who is in a better position to mitigate the
loss.28 For example, in Krell, because the plaintiff lessor would be
able to relet his room for the new coronation date, the defendant
was excused from the remainder of the payment.29 If the contract
allocates the risk already, however, courts are less willing to excuse
performance.30 This is true even if the risk has not been explicitly
allocated, but instead is so obvious as to be implicitly allocated.31
2. Implied Conditions. Excusal of performance is also justified by
the idea that the nonoccurrence of an implied condition means that
the contract has lost the higher value or special qualifications that

25 See Lloyd, 153 P.2d at 50 (“The question in cases involving frustration is whether the
equities of the case, considered in the light of sound public policy, require placing the risk of
a disruption or complete destruction of the contract equilibrium on defendant or plaintiff
. . . .”).
26 See N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon Cnty. Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 274 (7th Cir. 1986)
(“The contract permits NIPSCO to stop taking delivery of coal for any cause beyond [its]
reasonable control . . . including but not limited to . . . orders or acts of civil . . . authority . . .
which wholly or partly prevent . . . the utilizing . . . of the coal. This is what is known as a
force majeure clause.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
27 See id. at 277 (recounting the central question of Krell v. Henry).
28 See id. at 278 (“All are doctrines for shifting risk to the party better able to bear it.”). The
court uses the analogy of a grain grower and grain elevator to explain which party should
bear the loss. Id. In the instance that a grain grower’s crop, which was promised to the grain
elevator, is destroyed, discharge is normally allowed because the grower was incentivized to
avoid the destruction of their crops and the grain elevator can better absorb the risk because
it buys from a variety of growers. Id.
29 Id. at 277.
30 See id. at 278 (stating that since the frustration doctrine is meant to shift the risk
according to the presumed intentions of the parties, it is not to be used in cases when “the
contract explicitly assigns a particular risk to one party or the other”); see, e.g., In re CEC
Ent., Inc., 625 B.R. 344, 353 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2020) (holding that a lessee was not excused
from rent payments when the force majeure clause in the contract specifically required the
continuation of rent payments during acts of God).
31 See Lloyd v. Murphy, 153 P.2d 47, 51 (Cal. 1944) (emphasizing that although the contract
lacked a force majeure clause to deal with the impending war, the war’s occurrence was so
imminent as to raise the inference that defendant assumed the risk); see also Chi.,
Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Chi. & Nw. Transp. Co., 263 N.W.2d 189, 195 (1978)
(noting that during negotiations for their depot agreement, passenger reductions were
contemplated but not contracted for so the frustration defense could not be invoked).
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the bargaining parties expected the contract to have.32 This reason
relates to the requirement of substantial frustration because the
contract’s purpose has been frustrated if the consideration being
paid has lost its value. The lost value or qualifications must also
have been the principal purpose for making the contract.33
Generally, courts will interpret the party’s purpose for a contract
broadly, which creates a high bar for parties to meet when trying to
get their performance excused.34
B. FRUSTRATION AND LEASES

While this doctrine has been used sparingly to excuse
performance, it is even more rarely used to excuse a lessee from
their rent obligations under a lease.35 In fact, the leading American
32 See N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 795 F.2d at 277 (“Rarely is it impracticable or impossible for
the payor to pay; but if something has happened to make the performance for which he would
be paying worthless to him, an excuse for not paying, analogous to impracticability or
impossibility, may be proper.”); see also Krell v. Henry [1903] 2 KB 740, 750–51,
https://www.iclr.co.uk/document/1890226976/casereport_49530/html (distinguishing its
holding from a hypothetical of a cab hired, without special qualifications, to take someone to
a derby, because any cab would have served the purpose just as well). The concept of the
implied condition was explained earlier in the context of the impossibility doctrine. See Taylor
v.
Caldwell
(1863)
122
Eng.
Rep.
309,
312;
3
B.
&
S.
826
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/1863/J1.html (“[T]he parties must . . . have known
that [the contract] could not be fulfilled unless when the time for the fulfilment of the contract
arrived some particular specified thing continued to exist, so that, when entering into the
contract, they must have contemplated such continuing existence as the foundation.”).
33 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS. § 265 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“[T]he
purpose that is frustrated must have been a principal purpose of that party in making the
contract . . . . The object must be so completely the basis of the contract that, as both parties
understand, without it the transaction would make little sense.”).
34 See Swift Canadian Co. v. Banet, 224 F.2d 36, 38 (3d Cir. 1955) (holding that a buyer of
animal pelts was not excused from payment because the seller had shipped the pelts
according to the contract, even though unforeseen circumstances prevented their entry into
the United States); see also 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, at 654 (describing the Swift
Canadian case in terms of frustration of purpose); Brenner v. Little Red Sch. House, Ltd.,
274 S.E.2d 206, 209–10 (N.C. 1981) (holding that the plaintiff’s purpose in contracting with
defendant for a spot in their school was not just for his child to attend, but more broadly so
that the school would hold a space open for the child and prepare to teach the child).
35 See Lloyd, 153 P.2d at 49 (noting that, especially in the English courts, where the
doctrine developed, the frustration of purpose doctrine has not been applied to leases and that
many American courts have not allowed the defense); see also Krell, 2 KB at 750 (explaining
that the agreement in question was not to lease the rooms, but a license for the use for a
particular purpose).
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case on frustration involves a lessee who was made to pay their
rent.36 A leasehold is a conveyance, not just a contract, so the bar to
demonstrate frustration has often been held higher.37 A transfer of
a land estate transfers additional rights to the grantee than what a
party would receive in a contract.38 Courts tend to require more out
of lessees because they do not want to excuse payments if a business
is merely less profitable than expected, consequently increasing the
incentive to litigate.39 Although the standard is high, one court has
held that incidental uses still available to a lessee are not enough to
block a frustration defense.40 Although uncommon for courts to
excuse lessees,41 one court did so when the lessor refused to make
repairs to adjacent premises that the city required for the lessee to
get their business permit.42

See Lloyd, 153 P.2d at 48 (“[P]laintiffs leased to defendant for a five-year term . . . .”).
See id. at 49–50 (describing the few times frustration of purpose has excused a tenant);
see also 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, at 658 (“Although most of the other lease cases have
also recognized that the doctrine of frustration applies to leases, lessees have had little in
bringing themselves within the doctrine’s requirements.”).
38 See Wood v. Bartolino, 146 P.2d 883, 886 (N.M. 1944) (“A contract may be frustrated, but
a demise is more than a contract; it is a conveyance of an estate in land . . . . It transfers
proprietary as well as personal rights.”).
39 See Lloyd, 153 P.2d at 52 (“Litigation would be encouraged by the repudiation of leases
when lessees found their businesses less profitable . . . .”); see also Mel Frank Tool & Supply,
Inc. v. Di-Chem Co., 580 N.W.2d 802, 806–09 (Iowa 1998) (holding that a chemical company
had failed to carry the burden of proving its affirmative defense when it did not show evidence
that their lease had lost all value when regulations changed preventing them from storing
only some of their inventory at the leased premises); Essex Lincoln Garage, Inc. v. City of
Boston, 175 N.E.2d 466, 467 (Mass. 1961) (“[A] contracting party cannot be excused [under
the doctrine of frustration] where the only ‘frustration’ consists in the fact that known risks
assumed by [the contracting party] have turned out to be to his disadvantage” (quoting
Baetjer v. New England Alcohol Co., 66 N.E.2d 798, 803–04 (Mass. 1946) (second alteration
in original))).
40 See 20th Century Lites, Inc. v. Goodman, 149 P.2d 88, 92 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct.
1944) (holding that frustration may be invoked even if “incidental uses” remain for the lease).
41 See 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, at 658 (detailing why excusals have been so rare).
42 See Garner v. Ellingson, 501 P.2d 22, 24 (Ariz. App. 1972) (holding that the lessee was
excused from obligations under their one-year lease when the lessor, who also owned an
adjacent building, refused to make repairs that the city required for the lessee to obtain a
permit for their movie theater and bookstore they had planned to open).
36
37
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C. COVID-19 AND LEASES

The COVID-19 pandemic has brought an onslaught of cases
involving lessees asserting the frustration of purpose defense.43 By
and large, these challenges have been unsuccessful for a variety of
reasons. Allocation of risk within the lease has prevented several
lessees from asserting the defense,44 as has failure to demonstrate
substantial frustration45 and foreseeability.46
CEC Entertainment, better known as Chuck E. Cheese,
unsuccessfully argued that the COVID-19 pandemic and related
government restrictions on its operation were frustrating events
because the force majeure clauses in its lease agreements obligated

43 See, e.g., In re CEC Ent., Inc., 625 B.R. 344, 361 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2020) (holding that
the frustration doctrine did not relieve CEC of their lease obligations because force majeure
clauses in the contracts superseded the defense); Victoria’s Secret Stores, LLC v. Herald Sq.
Owner, LLC, No. 651833/2020, 2021 WL 69146, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 7, 2021) (holding
that the parties did allocate the risk of the lessee not being able to operate its business, even
though the specific reason for the government law requiring shutdown was not enumerated
in the lease); A/R Retail, LLC v. Hugo Boss Retail, Inc., 149 N.Y.S.3d 808, 824 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2021) (“[T]he adverse economic effects of the pandemic [did not] rise to the level of triggering
an extra-contractual common law right to rescind a 13-year lease.”); Gap, Inc. v. Ponte Gadea
N.Y., LLC, 524 F. Supp. 3d 224, 235 (S.D.N.Y 2021) (holding that the pandemic did not
frustrate the store’s purpose of operating a retail business); 35 E. 75th St. Corp. v. Christian
Louboutin, LLC, No. 154883/2020, 2020 WL 7315470, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 9, 2020)
(holding that decreased profitability was insufficient to warrant the frustration doctrine’s
application); Int’l Plaza Assocs. L.P. v. Amorepacific US, Inc., No. 155158/2020, 2020 WL
7416598, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 14, 2020) (denying lessor’s motion for summary judgment
as premature to allow for further discovery before a determination of foreseeability could be
made).
44 See CEC Ent., Inc., 625 B.R. at 357–58 (holding that the operator of Chuck E. Cheese
locations was prevented from asserting a frustration defense because a force majeure
provision allocated risk to operator); Victoria’s Secret Stores, 2021 WL 69146, at *1 (granting
the landlord’s motion for summary judgment against lessee because the risk of not being able
to operate their business was expressly allocated to lessee in the contract).
45 See Gap, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 3d at 235 (“Gap has not shown that the purpose of the Lease
. . . was ‘so completely’ frustrated by the COVID-19 pandemic that ‘the transaction [makes]
little sense.’” (quoting Crown IT Servs., Inc. v. Koval Olsen, 728 N.Y.S.2d 708, 711 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2004))); 35 E. 75th St. Corp., 2020 WL 7315470, at *4 (explaining that a loss in
profitability is insufficient to show substantial frustration).
46 See Gap, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 3d at 234 (“[T]he possibility of [a blanket prohibition on nonessential business] was referenced in the Lease itself, defeating any claim that the possibility
was ‘wholly unforeseeable.’”); A/R Retail, 149 N.Y.S.3d at 826 (holding that lessee was not
excused from rent payments because the risk of government restrictions was addressed in
the contract).
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CEC to pay rent despite government regulations.47 Gap, a popular
clothing store chain, also unsuccessfully asserted a frustration
defense.48 The court noted that, despite Gap’s claims “that the
pandemic . . . frustrated . . . [its ability] to operate a retail business,”
the company failed to demonstrate this claim because it was able to
operate for curbside pickup and to open some Manhattan locations
for in-person shopping, meaning its purpose was not substantially
frustrated.49 Hugo Boss, the lessee of a retail store in a luxury
shopping center owned by the plaintiff, was another business that
failed to successfully assert a frustration of purpose defense during
the pandemic.50 In that case, the court reasoned that the presence
of force majeure provisions requiring rent payments despite
government orders adequately demonstrated that the restrictions
the business was suffering under were foreseeable.51
D. FRUSTRATION IN OTHER COUNTRIES

Before proposing a solution, this Note compares how the
frustration of purpose defense has evolved in two other countries
with common law systems, the United Kingdom and Canada. This
comparison tracks the origins and evolution of the defense in these
countries to glean helpful modifications for the American version.
1. United Kingdom. The English test for frustration of purpose is
quite similar to the American test.52 Central tenets to the doctrine
47 See CEC Ent., Inc., 625 B.R. at 359–61 (enforcing CEC’s North Carolina and Washington
leases because the force majeure clauses superseded frustration doctrine).
48 See Gap, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 3d at 235 (“While undeniably unfortunate, the COVID-19
pandemic has not amounted to a frustration of the Lease’s purpose of Gap operating a retail
business at the Premises.”).
49 Id.
50 See A/R Retail, 149 N.Y.S.3d at 826 (“[W]hile the pandemic undeniably has hurt
Tenant’s business, the narrow doctrine of frustration of purpose is inapplicable as a matter
of law.”).
51 See id. (“[S]uch a provision suffices to demonstrate that the government closures and
capacity restrictions that interfered with Tenant’s use of the Premises in this case were not
‘wholly unforeseeable.’” (quoting Gap, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 3d at 234)).
52 See Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham Urb. Dist. Council [1956] AC 696, 729
https://www.iclr.co.uk/document/1951000082/casereport_24665/html (“[F]rustration occurs
whenever the law recognizes that without default of either party a contractual obligation has
become incapable of being performed because the circumstances in which performance is
called for would render it a thing radically different from that which was undertaken by the
contract.”).
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include that the frustrating event cannot have been caused by the
party seeking relief, that the doctrine should be narrowly applied,
and that its purpose is to achieve an equitable result.53 English
courts, however, did not recognize the defense for leases until well
into the twentieth century,54 explaining previously that the doctrine
was inapplicable to “a demise of unfurnished premises for a term of
years.”55 When an English court eventually extended the doctrine to
leases, it reiterated that the doctrine should be applied “hardly
ever.”56 The court further explained that the frustration doctrine is
a narrow exception to the common law rule that “the performance
of absolute promises is not excused by supervening impossibility of
performance,”57 which was established in Paradine v. Jane.58 The
holding in Paradine,59 while centuries old, has remained important
to contract law because it demonstrates the principle that parties
are responsible for bargaining for their best interest.60
One aspect of the English version of the defense that differs from
the American version is that in English courts, a finding of
frustration immediately discharges both parties of any obligations

53
See Canary Wharf v. Eur. Meds. Agency [2019] EWHC 335 (Ch) ¶ 24
https://www.iclr.co.uk/document/2019000444/transcriptXml_2019000444_201903121046267
3/html (restating five propositions identified by Lord Chief Justice Tom Bingham as to the
purpose of the English doctrine).
54 See Nat’l Carriers Ltd. v. Panalpina (N.) Ltd. [1981] 1 AC 675 (HL) 717,
https://www.iclr.co.uk/document/1981003098/casereport_18010/html (“In principle the
doctrine should be equally capable of universal application in all contractual arrangements.”).
55
Swift
v.
MacBean
[1942]
1
KB
375,
377,
https://www.iclr.co.uk/document/1890626705/casereport_74612/html. The court in Swift held
that the frustration doctrine was likewise inapplicable to a lease of furnished premises. See
id. at 377–78 (“There is no distinction for this purpose between the letting of furnished and
unfurnished premises.”).
56 Nat’l Carriers Ltd. [1981] 1 AC at 692.
57 Id. at 686.
58 See [1647] 4 (KB), http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/KB/1647/J5.html (holding that
the defendant lessee was required to pay rent to the plaintiff lessor even though he was
expelled from the property for three years during the English Civil War because the lessee
created a duty for himself in the contract and could have allocated the risks differently).
59 See id. (“[W]here the law creates a duty or charge, and the party is disabled to perform
it without any default in him, and hath no remedy over, there the law will excuse him.”).
60 See 14 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 15, § 74.1 (explaining that the theory behind
the strict common law rule pacta sunt servanda was that “the breaching party should protect
its interests by negotiating a suitable provision in the contract that addressed the possibility
of severe hardship”).
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of further performance.61 The English test also requires that the
frustrating event make performance under the contract “radically
different” from what was supposed by the parties.62 Thus, the
English test requires courts to evaluate the claim “first
quantitatively . . . then qualitatively.”63 As in the American system,
force majeure clauses in the English system function to limit the
frustration defense by providing evidence that the risks of a
supervening event have been assumed by one of the contracting
parties.64
English courts, like American courts, choose to limit the
application of the doctrine on public policy grounds. First, the courts
do not want to excuse a party from their contract simply because
they have bargained poorly.65 Second, because the finding of

61 See Nat’l Carriers Ltd. [1981] 1 AC at 701 (“[T]he doctrine has been developed by the law
as an expedient to escape from injustice where such would result from enforcement of a
contract in its literal terms after a significant change in circumstances.”). Rescission of the
contract is the general remedy under the American doctrine too, but reformation of the terms
of the contract is also an available remedy. In re CEC Ent., Inc., 625 B.R. 344, 357 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. 2020); see Spencer v. Slavin, No. 09 MISC 397931(GHP), 2011 WL 285147, at *8
(Mass. Land Ct. Jan. 18, 2011) (explaining when an instrument can be reformed because of
frustration); Printing Indus. Ass’n of N. Ohio, Inc. v. Graphic Arts Int’l Union, Loc. 546, 628
F. Supp. 1103, 1110 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (recognizing that reformation is an available remedy
for frustration of purpose).
62
See Canary Wharf v. Eur. Meds. Agency [2019] EWHC 335 (Ch) ¶ 27,
https://www.iclr.co.uk/document/2019000444/transcriptXml_2019000444_201903121046267
3/html (arguing that a radical change in the nature of the contract is the best formulation of
the frustration doctrine). One court asserted that because of the all-or-nothing results of an
application of the frustration doctrine against one party or the other, the frustration doctrine
does not always result in justice, although achieving justice is its purpose. See Edwinton Com.
Corp.
v.
The
Sea
Angel
[2007]
EWCA
(Civ)
547
¶ 112,
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2007/547.html (“Ultimately the application of the
test cannot safely be performed without the consequences of the decision, one way or the
other, being measured against the demands of justice.”).
63 Bank of N.Y. Mellon (Int’l) Ltd. v. Cine-UK Ltd. [2021] EWHC 1013 (QB) ¶ 209,
https://www.iclr.co.uk/ (search “[2021] EWHC 1013 (QB)”). The court first must evaluate
quantitatively the claim in terms of the time left on the lease after the supervening event is
likely to subside. Id. Then, the court must qualitatively evaluate whether the performance
has become radically different. Id.
64 See HUGH BEALE, CHITTY ON CONTRACTS § 26-061 (34th ed. 2021) (“A force majeure
clause may be relied upon as evidence that the parties have made express provision for the
event which has occurred so that the doctrine of frustration is thereby excluded.”).
65 See Pioneer Shipping Ltd. v. BTP Tioxide Ltd. [1982] AC 724 (HL) 752,
https://www.iclr.co.uk/document/1971003471/casereport_37805/html (“[T]he doctrine is not
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frustration immediately discharges the contractual duties, it is a
strong remedy that should be granted carefully.66
Although the common law defense of frustration still exists in the
United Kingdom, most frustrated contracts under English law are
covered by the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943.67 The
law does not change the standard used to determine frustration, but
rather alters the consequences of a frustrated contract.68 Unlike the
common law, which requires automatic discharge of the contract,
the Act allows courts to sever the contract in certain circumstances
to allow for some continued performance.69 The Act also allows for
the recovery of money already paid, which the common law did
not.70 And, slightly different than the purpose of the common law
doctrine,71 the purpose of the Act is to prevent the “unjust
enrichment of either party to the contract at the other’s expense.”72
During the COVID-19 pandemic, there have been few instances
of companies asserting the frustration defense in the United
Kingdom.73 A recent case discussed the use of a proportionality test
when defendant lessees asserted a “temporary frustration
defense.”74 In circumstances when the frustrating event will not last
for the entire length of the contract, it is possible to successfully
lightly to be invoked to relieve contracting parties of the normal consequences of imprudent
commercial bargains.”).
66 See id. at 728–29 (“Because frustration has such draconian consequences for the parties,
the question whether there has been frustration should be one [for] the court.”).
67 See Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943, 6 & 7 Geo. 6 c. 40, § 2 (listing certain
contracts not included under the Act, including charterparties and insurance contracts).
68 See id. § 1 (describing the adjusted rights and liabilities of parties to the contracts under
the Act, but not defining a standard for frustration).
69 See id. § 2 (“Where it appears to the court that a part of any contract to which this Act
applies can properly be severed from the remainder of the contract . . . the court shall treat
that part of the contract as if it were a separate contract.”).
70 See id. § 1 (stating that money paid under the contract may be recovered as well as money
for a “valuable benefit” that had been conferred).
71 See supra notes 27–33 and accompanying text.
72
BP
Expl.
Co.
Ltd.
v.
Hunt
[1979]
1
WLR
783
(QB)
799.
https://www.iclr.co.uk/document/1971000266/casereport_46483/html.
73 Peter de Verneuil Smith, Adam Kramer & William Day, COVID-19: Force Majeure,
Frustration and Illegality in English Law: A Detailed Guide, THOMSON REUTERS (Apr. 20,
2021), https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/w-024-6685.
74 See Bank of N.Y. Mellon (Int’l) Ltd. v. Cine-UK Ltd. [2021] EWHC 1013 (QB) ¶ 194,
https://www.iclr.co.uk (search “[2021] EWHC 1013 (QB)”) (highlighting the idea of
“temporary frustration” caused by the COVID-19 pandemic advanced by the defendant in
response to demands for rent payments).
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assert a frustration defense depending on the ratio of the length of
frustration to the length of time remaining in the contract.75 An
important note, especially in the context of a pandemic, is that the
parties do not have to wait and see how long the frustrating event
lasts; rather, the contract can be discharged if a reasonable person
could find that the event would lead to substantial frustration.76
Just as in the United States, lessees in the United Kingdom will
likely be unsuccessful in challenging their leases using the complete
frustration defense based on the few cases that have thus far been
decided.77 One court wrote that the COVID-19 pandemic and related
government regulations “would, or at least could, qualify as a
supervening event,”78 but that the ordered closures could not be
expected to last more than eighteen months so the frustration
defense was not successful.79 This court did note, however, that a
decision may come out differently when a lease ends during an
expected lock-down as opposed to after one.80 Another court, ruling
on a case involving nonpayment of rent by a lessee following
multiple government-imposed lockdowns, asserted that previous
frustration cases do not support the argument that rent should be
75 See id. ¶ 196 (noting that discharge may be allowed even if a possibility of performance
remains). This determination is known as the “proportionality test.” Id.
76 See id. (“Commercial men must not be asked to wait till the end of a long delay to find
out from what in fact happens whether they are bound by the contract or not. They must be
entitled to act on reasonable commercial probabilities at the time when they are called upon
to make up their minds.” (citation omitted)).
77 See, e.g., Salam Air SAOC v. Latam Airlines Grp. [2020] EWHC 2414 (Comm) ¶ 56,
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2020/2414.html (finding a lessee’s argument
that their leases had been frustrated by the Covid-19 pandemic weak); Bank of N.Y. Mellon,
EWHC 1013 (QB) ¶ 247 (granting summary judgment to landlords in their claims for overdue
rent payments which accrued during the COVID-19 pandemic).
78 Bank of N.Y. Mellon, EWHC 1013 (QB) ¶ 209.
79 See id. (ruling for the landlords on summary judgment because of an expectation that
the leases had years remaining for performance once the frustrating event subsided). In
Salam Air, however, the court does not explicitly address whether the pandemic was a
supervening event, but rather focuses on the airline’s assumption of the risk. See Salam Air,
EWHC 2414 (Comm) ¶ 54 (“The risk that SalamAir might be unable to undertake passenger
flights from Muscat or elsewhere in Oman for some significant period, or that there might be
a dramatic and long-lasting fall in the demand for air travel more generally, were risks
inherent in the commercial operation of the Aircraft and assumed by SalamAir under the
Aircraft Leases.”).
80 See Bank of N.Y. Mellon, EWHC 1013 (QB) ¶ 209 (“I am not considering a case where
the contractual Lease term . . . ended during a or an expected lockdown. That could be argued
to be a different situation.”).
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excused if the lease can no longer be used for its intended purpose.81
This court further held that an unjust enrichment argument should
not be used to support a frustration claim when the contract has not
been discharged.82
2. Canada. The Canadian courts adopted their frustration of
purpose test from a leading British case, Davis Contractors Ltd. v.
Fareham Urban District Council,83 in which a contractor
unsuccessfully claimed that their contract to build houses was
frustrated because of a labor shortage and that they should have
been paid based on quantum meruit84 instead of the original
contract price.85 Like the English courts, Canadian courts have
rejected the “implied term” theory of the frustration doctrine,86 and
instead have adopted the “radical change in the obligation”
approach.87 The Canadian doctrine has a familiar strictness in its
application due to the absolute nature of the remedy88 and its nature
as a “special exception which justice demands.”89 Like in both the
American and English tests, foreseeability of a frustrating event
does not automatically preclude the doctrine’s application in

81 See London Trocadero (2015) LLP v Picturehouse Cinemas Ltd. [2021] EWHC 2591 (Ch)
¶ 141, http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2021/2591.html (“[T]here is a longstanding
principle that an inability of a tenant to use premises for the purposes intended at the time
the lease was granted will not provide a defence to a claim for the payment of rent.”). The
court argued that allowing a defense for failure of consideration would extend the frustration
doctrine to create temporary or partial frustration, which is not recognized in the law. Id.
¶ 168.
82 See id. ¶¶ 169–70 (arguing that to allow a failure of consideration defense to a contract
still in existence would not be “right as a matter of principle” and could lead to injustice
because of the arbitrary allocation of loss that would occur). This is, however, assuming that
the contract is still in existence. Id.
83
[1956]
AC
696,
729–30,
https://www.iclr.co.uk/document/1951000082/casereport_24665/html.
84 Quantum Meruit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The reasonable value of
services; damages awarded in an amount considered reasonable to compensate a person who
has rendered services in a quasi-contractual relationship.”).
85 Davis Contractors Ltd., AC 696 at 728–30.
86 Naylor Grp. Inc. v. Ellis-Don Constr. Ltd., 2001 SCC 58, para. 54 (Can.) (“The implied
term theory is now largely rejected because of its reliance on fiction and imputation.”).
87 Id. para. 56.
88 See Indus. Overload Ltd. v. McWatters, 1972 CarswellSask 32, para. 6 (Can. Sask.
C.Q.B.) (WL) (“[T]he discharge of a contract on the ground of frustration occurs automatically
upon the happening of the frustrating event . . . .”).
89 Id. para. 6 (citing Hirji Mulji v. Cheong Yue SS. Co. [1926] AC 917 (PC) 927 (appeal
taken from Can.)).
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Canada.90 All versions of the doctrine also “assume[] that the
frustrating event was not caused by the fault of either party to the
contract.”91 The courts also recognize several types of common
frustrating events, including subsequent changes in the law or
supervening illegality.92 The doctrine may also apply in “situations
where the contract may be both physically and legally capable of
being performed but would be totally different from what the parties
intended were it performed after the change that has occurred.”93
The policy goals underlying the defense in Canada are similar to
those in the American doctrine, including preventing injustice and
encouraging parties to allocate the risk.94
All of Canada’s thirteen provinces and territories, except Nova
Scotia and Quebec, have a version of the Frustrated Contracts Act.95
As an example, Ontario’s statute empowers courts, as with the
English statute, to order repayment of benefits received,96

90 See id. (“The fact that the parties, at the time of contracting, actually foresaw the
possibility of the event or new circumstances in question does not necessarily prevent the
doctrine of frustration from applying when that event takes place.”).
91 Id. para. 10.
92 See Petrogas Processing Ltd. v. Westcoast Transmission Co., 1988 CarswellAlta 75, para.
49 (Can. Alta. Q.B.) (WL) (“Subsequent changes in the law having a fundamental effect on
performance of the contract and supervening illegality are treated as similar but distinct
sources of frustration . . . .”), aff’d, 1989 CarswellAlta 60 (Can. Alta. Ct. App.).
93 Cowie v. Great Blue Heron Charity Casino, 2011 ONSC 6357, para. 23 (Can. Ont. S.C.).
94 See Petrogas Processing Ltd., 1988 CarswellAlta 75, para. 50 (noting that generally
courts will not intervene if a contract is frustrated because the parties could have stipulated
certain risks in the contract beforehand unless the event was “so unforeseeable or so
destructive of the commercial purpose” that enforcing the contract would be unjust (citation
omitted)).
95 See Frustrated Contracts Act, R.S.A. 2000, c F-27 (Can. Alta.); Frustrated Contract Act,
R.S.B.C. 1996, c 166 (Can. B.C.); The Frustrated Contracts Act, R.S.M. 1987, c F190 (Can.
Man.); Frustrated Contracts Act, R.S.N.B. 2011, c 164 (Can. N.B.); Frustrated Contracts Act,
R.S.N.L. 1990, c F-26 (Can. Nfld.); Frustrated Contracts Act, R.S.O. 1990, c F.34 (Can. Ont.);
Frustrated Contracts Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c F-16 (Can. P.E.I.); The Frustrated Contracts Act,
S.S. 1994, c F-22.2 (Can. Sask.); Frustrated Contracts Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c F-12 (Can.
N.W.T.); Frustrated Contracts Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c 96 (Can. Yukon); Frustrated Contracts Act,
R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c F-12 (Can. Nun.).
96 Frustrated Contracts Act, R.S.O. 1990, c F.34, s 3 (3) (Can. Ont.) (“[T]he court, if it
considers it just to do so having regard to all the circumstances, may allow the other party to
recover from the party benefitted the whole or any part of the value of the benefit.”).
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repayment of sums received,97 and severance of part of the
contract.98
Canadian courts acknowledge the application of the frustration
doctrine to leases,99 adopting reasoning from a seminal English
case.100 Canadian courts have also thus far been reluctant to excuse
lease payments using COVID-19 as a frustrating event.101 First,
applying the “radically different” approach to the circumstances of
the lease in question, courts have found that the nature of the
contractual obligations did not change.102 Additionally, courts have
contended that frustration did not apply because the governmental
regulations were only temporary frustrating events.103 Finally,
when the contract contains a force majeure clause, one Canadian

97 Id. s 3 (2) (“[The court] may allow the party to retain or to recover, as the case may be,
the whole or any part of the sums paid or payable not exceeding the amount of the expenses.”).
98 Id. s 3 (7) (“Where it appears to the court that a part of the contract can be severed . . .
the court shall treat that part of the contract as if it were a separate contract that had not
been frustrated and shall treat this section as applicable only to the remainder of the
contract.”).
99 See Cap. Quality Homes Ltd. v. Colwyn Constr. Ltd., 1975 CarswellOnt 852, para. 30
(Can. Ont. C.A.) (WL) (“I adopt the reasoning of Viscount Simon and his conclusion that there
is no binding authority precluding the application of the doctrine of frustration to contracts
involving the lease of lands.”); see also 2284064 Ont. Inc. v. Shunock, 2017 CarswellOnt
19417, para. 70 (Can. Ont.) (WL) (“There is no question that the doctrine of frustration applies
to contracts affecting land.”).
100 See Cricklewood Prop. & Inv. Tr. Ltd. v. Leightons Inv. Tr. Ltd. [1945] AC 221, 228–29
(observing that frustration could occur in leases, although rarely, and that to say otherwise
because a lease is the conveyance of an estate rather than a contract would be circular
reasoning); see also First Real Props. Ltd. v. Biogen Idec Can. Inc., 2013 CarswellOnt 15027,
paras. 41–46 (noting that the frustration doctrine applies to leases if the foundation of the
contract is destroyed, as held in Cricklewood).
101 See, e.g., Bank of Montreal v. 2643612 Ont. Ltd., 2021 ONSC 4401, para. 18 (holding
that the frustration doctrine does not apply to a lessee who owned and operated a restaurant
during the COVID-19 pandemic).
102 See id. paras. 18–19 (maintaining that the fundamental purpose of the contract was
simply to lend and repay money); see also Braebury Dev. Corp. v. Gap (Canada) Inc., 2021
ONSC 6210, para. 43 (“Given that Gap was not required to operate its retail store under the
lease, its inability to do so cannot be said to have radically altered the lease’s terms . . . . By
contrast, if Gap had been required under the lease to operate the premises as a retail store,
its inability to do so by a supervening event may have risen to the level of radical change
required to engage the doctrine of frustration.” (footnote omitted)).
103 See Bank of Montreal, 2021 ONSC 4401, para. 18 (“[T]he pandemic-related measures do
not constitute a permanent disruption.”); Braebury Dev. Corp., 2021 ONSC 6210, para. 44
(“[T]o frustrate a contract, the supervening event must be a permanent, as opposed to a
temporary, setback.”).
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court found that the clause controlled.104 Courts generally hold that
COVID-19 qualifies as a frustrating event under the Canadian
doctrine, yet one court reached the opposite conclusion when a
settlement payment agreement was made during the pandemic.105
Another court noted that frustration did not apply because the mere
existence of the COVID-19 pandemic did not alter the nature of the
contract in any way.106
While the frustration defense has largely failed to excuse lessees
and other contracting parties, it did come to the rescue of one
Canadian family whose airline tickets were canceled because of the
pandemic.107 The British Columbia Civil Resolutions Tribunal,
which has jurisdiction over certain small claims, reasoned that,
even though the defendant family could have used a flight voucher
to travel back to Canada at a later date, they were justified in taking
a rescue flight because they had already been stranded for over two
months and had had three return flights canceled.108 The Tribunal
also applied the frustration doctrine and ordered the refund of dance
competition fees to the parents from their daughters’ dance
academy when their 2020 competition was canceled.109 The nature
of the Tribunal gives tribunal members great latitude to hear,
decide on, and interpret evidence, meaning that the decision would

104 See Braebury Dev. Corp., 2021 ONSC 6210, para. 46 (“[T]he existence of the force
majeure clause clearly shows that the parties to the lease contemplated situations in which,
due to circumstances beyond the control of the parties, performance of obligations under the
lease would be delayed, hindered, or prevented, and made provision in their contract
accordingly.”).
105 See Sub-Prime Mortg. Corp. v. Kaweesa, 2021 ONSC 739, para. 29 (“[T]he supposed
supervening event—the pandemic—was contemplated by the parties at the time of
contracting, since it was ongoing then with no prospect of early resolution.”).
106 See Royal Bank of Can. v. 974585 Can. Corp., 2021 ONSC 2908, paras. 19–20
(emphasizing that the business had earned no income before the onset of the pandemic and
that the agreement was “nothing more than the lending of a sum of money upon certain
terms,” which was not altered by the pandemic).
107 See Sohi Vacations Ltd. v. Waraich, 2021 CanLII 218, para. 28 (Can. B.C. C.R.T.)
(holding that the pandemic was a frustrating event that radically changed the nature of
plaintiff travel agent’s obligation to provide a return flight when all flights were canceled).
108 See id. paras. 26–27 (emphasizing that the contract may not have been frustrated after
the first two cancellations but was by the third).
109 See Ward v. S.R.F. Holdings Ltd., 2020 CanLII 1446, paras. 17, 32–33 (Can. B.C. C.R.T.)
(holding that the postponement of a yearly event constituted a cancelation and, thus, a
frustrating event).
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likely have not been decided in favor of applicants in the traditional
court system.110

III. ANALYSIS
The problem with the United States’s current frustration of
purpose doctrine is that it is too narrow to be helpful to most lessees
in need. Its narrow application is widely acknowledged111 and has
even led to some advocacy to abolish it.112 Two public policy reasons
support expanding the frustration of purpose doctrine. First, lessors
are generally in a better position to bear the burden of a frustrating
event because they can mitigate damages by reletting the property
to a new lessee.113 Second, it is unfair to make a lessee continue to
pay rent if the lease is now worthless to the lessee.114 This Note
proposes that the current standards should be altered to better help
lessees be excused from frustrated leases.
A. FIRST ALTERATION

The first proposed alteration is easing the requirement that the
principal purpose be substantially frustrated. Courts should try to
read a party’s intention for entering into a contract narrowly,
allowing implicit conditions to be more readily accepted. American

See id. paras. 6–9 (“[T]he CRT may accept as evidence information that it considers
relevant, necessary and appropriate, whether or not the information would be admissible in
a court of law.”).
111 See 30 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 77:94 (4th ed. 2022) (“The doctrine
of commercial frustration should be limited in its application and narrowly applied to
preserve the certainty of contracts.”); see also Garner v. Ellingson, 501 P.2d 22, 24 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1972) (“The doctrine of frustration has been severely limited to cases of extreme
hardship so as not to diminish the power of parties to contract.”).
112 See Lavneet Dhillon, Note, Abolishing the Doctrine of Frustration, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
2605, 2632 (2021) (“In light of the inconsistencies surrounding the doctrine’s application, this
Note argues that the best solution is to abolish the doctrine entirely.”).
113 See N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon Cnty. Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 277 (7th Cir. 1986)
(discussing Krell v. Henry by asking “to which party did the contract (implicitly) allocate the
risk?” and nothing that “[s]urely Henry had not intended to insure Krell against the
possibility of the coronation’s being postponed, since Krell could always relet the room, at the
premium rental, for the coronation’s new date” and “[s]o Henry was excused”).
114 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS. § 265 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1981) (explaining
that a frustrating event may warrant discharge if its occurrence is “so severe that it is not
fairly to be regarded as within the risks that he assumed under the contract”).
110
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courts could take a lead from the British Columbia Civil Resolutions
Tribunal in its approach to settling claims.115 In deciding that the
defendant family’s flight plans were frustrated, the Tribunal—
whether intentionally or not—read the purpose of the contract
narrowly.116 Courts following the common law would likely decide
that the purpose of the contract was to provide a return flight home,
which the company would have been able to provide. However, the
Tribunal recognized the importance of the particular flight home
bargained for in the contract and read the purpose narrowly.
One factor courts could use to determine the principal purpose is
how significantly the frustrating event changes the nature of the
impacted business. Furthermore, while society does not want to let
business owners escape a lease simply because their enterprise is
less profitable than expected, lost profits could also be a factor in
determining frustration. While the failure of a business is always a
possibility, neither the lessor nor lessee would assert that an
unprofitable business was assumed in the contract. But if the
business has no profit, it cannot be reasonably expected that the
business will be able to pay rent.
For example, a large retail business, like Victoria’s Secret, which
leases commercial space in the prime shopping district of
Manhattan, clearly intends to operate an in-person business open
to tourists and passersby. A court reading its contract’s purpose
broadly would say that it intends to operate a retail business only.
But a narrow reading would acknowledge the nature and context.
Therefore, when a pandemic strikes and government regulations
limit travel and force stores to close, the lease has been frustrated.
Even if a retail location is open for curbside pickup or can still
operate as a warehouse to fulfill online orders, those activities were
not the intention of the lessees when selecting the location.
See supra notes 107–110 and accompanying text.
See Sohi Vacations Ltd. v. Waraich, 2021 CanLII 218 para. 28 (Can. B.C. C.R.T.) (“I find
the contract between Sohi and the Waraichs was frustrated because the pandemic was an
unforeseeable event, not provided for in the contract, and not either party’s fault.”). This
narrow reading is exemplified in the Tribunal’s recognition that the purpose of the contract
was not just to have a flight home, but to have a flight home within a relatively limited
timeframe, which the defendant was unable to provide. See id. para. 27 (“Although Sohi
implies that the Waraichs could have used a flight voucher to travel at a later date, there was
no certainty as to when such travel could occur. By the time of the May 18 flight cancellation,
the Waraichs had already waited in India for nearly two months beyond their initial return
booking.”).
115
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B. SECOND ALTERATION

A second alteration to the doctrine is to clarify the foreseeability
requirement. While courts have held that the frustrating event does
not have to be completely unforeseeable,117 a clearer standard would
be easier for courts to apply. Frustrating events like natural
disasters, wars, and pandemics are inevitable. This does not mean,
however, that all frustrating events are foreseeable. The court
should evaluate whether the specific frustrating event at issue was
reasonably foreseeable.
For example, wars in general are foreseeable, but a specific
attack may not be.118 In Lloyd, World War II and its effects were
foreseeable frustrating events to the parties to the lease because the
government restriction, which interfered with defendant’s business
by curbing the sale of new automobiles, had been the law for over a
year when the lease was signed.119 In late 2019 and early 2020,
however, even as COVID-19 spread throughout Asia, many did not
expect or predict the extent to which it would impact the United
States.120 Although the public has knowledge that pandemics occur,

See Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Chi. & N.W. Transp. Co., 263 N.W.2d
189, 195 (Wis. 1978) (“[F]oreseeability of the frustrating event is not alone enough to bar
recission if it appears that the parties did not intend the promisor to assume the risk of its
occurrence.” (citation omitted)).
118 Attacks on the United States during peacetime—whether it be by a foreign nation like
the bombing of Pearl Harbor, an act of terrorism like the attacks of September 11, 2001, or
an act of domestic terrorism like the Boston Marathon bombing—are unpredictable by design.
See Linton Weeks, 5 Other Surprise Attacks That Changed History, NPR (Sept. 6, 2011, 12:09
PM),
https://www.npr.org/2011/09/06/140156564/5-other-surprise-attacks-that-changedhistory (describing consequential surprise attacks throughout history).
119 Lloyd v. Murphy, 153 P.2d 47, 51 (Cal. 1944). Wars in general are always foreseeable,
and in this specific case, the possibility that automobiles would be restricted by the
government was so foreseeable as to almost be a certainty, which is partially why the
frustration defense did not apply. See id. (“Automobile sales were soaring because the public
anticipated that production would soon be restricted. These facts were commonly known
. . . .”).
120 By the end of March 2020, Dr. Anthony Fauci, Director of the National Institute of
Allergy and Infectious Diseases, estimated that the United States would have 100,000 to
200,000 COVID-19 deaths. Matthew Yglesias, Fauci Predicts Over 100,000 COVID-19 Deaths
in
the
United
States,
VOX
(Mar.
29,
2020,
12:30
PM),
https://www.vox.com/2020/3/29/21198723/coronavirus-deaths-estimate-fauci. By late May
2022, however, over 1,000,000 people had already died from COVID-19 in the United States.
Adeel Hassan, The U.S. Surpasses 1 Million Covid Deaths, the World’s Highest Known Total,
117
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diseases have spread at smaller scales in recent years and a
reasonable person would not have foreseen this specific pandemic’s
lasting impacts. Therefore, COVID-19 should be considered an
unforeseeable event not contemplated by either party in most
instances, unlike World War II in Lloyd. Although many contracts
have force majeure clauses describing government restrictions on
business activity, very few could rightfully be understood to have
contemplated the extent to which the COVID-19 pandemic would
ravage the United States.
C. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

To improve the American doctrine, courts and state legislatures
should consider two aspects of the frustration defense abroad: (1)
promoting a uniform statute and (2) adopting a proportionality test.
The uniformity of the Frustrated Contracts Acts in both the United
Kingdom and Canada would improve the American system by
making the remedies more predictable, even if it would not change
the method of determining frustration.121 Although it is difficult to
adopt a uniform statute across all fifty states, the proposal of a
uniform statute would be a first step at addressing the disparity of
the defense across different states.
Further, adopting a proportionality test122 would be enormously
beneficial to frustrated plaintiffs without unjustly enriching one
party or the other. A frustrating event, like a COVID-19 lockdown,
may leave the possibility of future performance while completely
frustrating it in the present. By evaluating the length left in a
contract, courts could fairly determine when excusal is appropriate.
D. COUNTERARGUMENTS

Considering that these proposals are extensive alterations to the
current frustration doctrine, there are some arguments against
expanding the doctrine. First, loosening the requirements of the

N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/19/us/us-covid-deaths.html (last updated May
19, 2022).
121 See supra notes 66–70, 95–98 (discussing the Frustrated Contracts Acts in the United
Kingdom and Canada, respectively).
122 Bank of N.Y. Mellon (Int’l) Ltd. v. Cine-UK Ltd. [2021] EWHC 1013 (QB) ¶ 196; see
supra notes 74–76.
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frustration doctrine could threaten the sanctity of contracts and the
power of parties to contract. It is possible that an expanded
frustration defense will discourage careful contract drafting if
lessees view the defense as a get-out-of-jail-free card allowing for
excusal of performance even if the risks have already been allocated
in the contract. Fundamentally, society wants to encourage good
faith in contracting, and this good faith could be threatened if there
are perceived “easy outs” tempting lessees. Second, because risks
are usually already allocated in contracts using a force majeure
clause or something similar, this expanded doctrine will be
ineffective because lessees will still be precluded from asserting it.
These proposed alterations to the frustration doctrine will not,
however, threaten the sanctity of contract because the alterations
do not eliminate the parties’ ability to use force majeure clauses to
allocate the risks of frustrating events. Therefore, a broader
doctrine will not inhibit lessors from carefully contracting away the
possibility of a lessee asserting a frustration defense. Further, a
narrow remedy does not mean it is ineffective. Despite the current
defense’s strict requirements, parties are still occasionally relieved
from their obligations, so loosening the requirements will only
continue to aid those lessees who need it.

IV. CONCLUSION
Almost 120 years after King Edward VII’s coronation was
postponed for emergency surgery, contracting parties still rely on
frustration of purpose as a last-ditch effort to be excused from a
contract. While parties are unsuccessful more often than not, the
doctrine still has the potential to be of use in the twenty-first
century. When acts of God occur, at least one party to a contract is
bound to bear the risk of a frustrated contract. In proposing to
expand the frustration of purpose doctrine, this Note attempts to
alter the doctrine so that the risk falls on the party better equipped
to bear it; namely, the lessors. Lessees have historically had a
particularly difficult time winning frustration cases, but altering
the doctrine would allow for excusal more often without
endangering the sanctity of the contract.
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